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Over the last 10 years, there has been a remarkable advance in financial integration in the EU 
and especially the euro area. As evidenced by European Central Bank research, money 
markets are now completely integrated within the euro area, and the only significant reason 
why government bonds are not perfect substitutes to each-other is the persistence of specific 
issuer risk. A large, liquid and efficient corporate bond market has been created, whose size 
has more than doubled since the launch of the single currency. Public (let alone private) 
equity markets are still less integrated and less competitive, but changes are noticeable. 
Finally, after having remained sheltered for a long time, the banking sector has recently 
experienced a recent rise in large-scale cross-border mergers.   
There are certainly not only bright spots in the landscape. Some markets remain segmented, 
and the Lamfalussy process for legislation and regulation is a slow and cumbersome one. 
According to the European Commission (2004, 2005) there is very little evidence of 
integration, or advance towards it, in retail services such as consumer credit, mortgage credit 
and insurance. In these sectors, cross-border transactions are virtually nonexistent and price 
divergence remains important. The picture is therefore not a uniform one.  
The question is, how should one assess this situation in the context of the broader European 
economic agenda? The usual answer is that much has been achieved but that more efforts are 
needed in order to reap the full benefits of financial integration – until we reach the end-goal, 
namely, a completely integrated market. This has been, and still is to a large extent, the vision 
that inspires the European Commission – a simple, forceful proposition that everybody can 
understand and which can easily be developed into an agenda.  
This is also a view that economists find hard to dispute. We all know that financial integration 
yields significant benefits (this was actually one of the motives for undertaking the creation of 
a single currency). We also know that as a rule, opposition to it is inspired by the desire to 
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perpetuate inefficient arrangements and protect rents. Efficiency arguments thus seem to call 
for more integration.      
But is it a view that helps to best define an agenda for the next few years? I would like to 
suggest here is that though broadly appropriate, the standard approach to financial integration 
remains somewhat general and does not take sufficiently into account the economic priorities 
of the EU and the euro area.  
In what follows, I start with some stylised facts on the current state of financial integration in 
comparison to the degree of integration of products and labour markets. I discuss next the 
implications of this situation for the integration agenda. I then turn to the current economic 
priorities of the EU and the role financial integration can play, before concluding.  
Throughout this paper, the main focus is on the euro area, though I will also make 
observations with relevance for the EU as a whole.  
 
1. Capital, product, and labour market integration      
A stated goal of the EU is to create a single market for goods, services, persons and capital. 
Since the very early days, financial integration has been part of this wider agenda. An 
appropriate starting point is therefore to compare the state of financial integration to the state 
of integration in other areas.  
This is a less easy task than it seems because appropriate indicators for comparing the degree 
of integration across markets are lacking. But there is little doubt that on the whole, European 
financial markets today are at more integrated than product markets and by a very wide 
margin more integrated than labour markets.  
Let us start with capital. As indicated, there are many different markets we could look at, but 
a few general observations can be made. Philip Lane (2005a, 2005b) recently assessed 
patterns of cross-border bond holdings. He finds that in the euro area, more than 60% of the 
bonds in the residents’ international portfolios are issued by other euro area countries, a 
disproportionate proportion in view of the weight of the area. The bias is less pronounced for 
equities, but here also, there is a discernable EMU effect. This bias is robust to the inclusion 
in econometric equations of natural determinants of financial flows such as trade links, 
common language and common borders. Lane’s central estimate of the euro effect is that it   3
has raised bilateral holdings between member countries by 97 percent for bonds and 62 
percent for equities. 
This does not mean that the “home bias” has disappeared. Comparisons to a benchmark world 
market portfolio in which assets are allocated according to the size of each market indicate 
that European investors’ portfolios remain tilted towards national assets. But this is much less 
the case than in the past, and less than in the US or Japan. Furthermore, research on portfolio 
allocation within the US indicates that even in a market that has been integrated for a very 
long time, local or regional biases remain: looking at equity holdings, Coval and Moskowitz 
(1999) find that US fund managers exhibit a strong preference for locally headquartered firms 
and that a 2000 km distance to between the residence of the portfolio manager and the firm’s 
headquarter reduces the weight of its stock by roughly 10 percentage points. Against this 
background, the persistence of financial home bias in Europe is hardly surprising.        
What about trade? Building on John Mc Callum’s seminal 1995 paper, Thierry Mayer and 
Soledad Zignago (2005a, 2005b) have developed measures of the border effect within the EU. 
They find that even in the most integrated sectors, large EU member states trade 6 times more 
with themselves than with neighbours. On average, depending on the estimates, EU member 
states trade 10 to 20 times more internally than with neighbours. Here again, certainly, there is 
“home bias at home”: trade within US states is 3 times higher than trade between them (Wolf, 
2000). But even discounting this factor, it appears that the EU goods markets are still very far 
from being integrated.  
Even more worryingly, the Single Market does not seem to have had a significant acceleration 
effect on trade flows – not to speak of services. Mayer and Zignago (2005a) contrast the quick 
reduction in the border effect between the US and Canada following the signing of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement with the quasi-stagnation of trade integration within the 
Single Market. The euro has also had an effect on trade flows, but controlling again for 
natural determinants, current estimates of the euro effect are between 5 and 15% (Baldwin, 
2006). Product markets could not be expected to adjust as fast as financial markets and part of 
the real effect of EMU is certainly still to come. Nevertheless, the experience so far suggests, 
first, that early estimates of the trade effects of the single currency à la Andrew Rose (2000) 
were excessive and, second, that even under the best circumstances convergence towards the 
new steady state will be a long process.  
Furthermore, the euro area members paradoxically tend to be less keen on creating a true 
Single Market than countries not belonging to the euro area. The euro area, and within it the   4
group of the three largest countries, Germany, France and Italy – scores distinctively worse 
than the EU25 average or the non-euro EU15 on a series of indicators such as the delay in 
transposing EU directives into national law, the number of cases of non-communication for 
transposition in national legislation, the number of infringements for incorrect applications of 
internal market rules. This has led former Commissioner Mario Monti
2 to observe that the 
euro area is at risk of drifting towards becoming a currency without a market.  
Research by Juan Delgado (2006) of Bruegel has 
attempted to compare directly the home bias for 
goods and equity markets through estimating an 
index that can be used both for goods and stocks. 
The figure summarises his main finding: controlling 
for size and distance, the home bias for equities in 
the average EU 15 country has decreased much 
faster and is now significantly lower than the home 
bias for goods. It is also lower than in the US
3.  
Turning finally to labour markets, it is well-known 
that labour mobility within the EU remains very 
low. On average, 98.6% of the EU citizens live in 
their home country, a strikingly high proportion in 
comparison to the US, where 67.4% of the citizens 
live in their birth state. Migration is certainly on the 
rise, especially following the 2004 enlargement, but 
labour immobility remains a fair characterisation of the stylised facts. Furthermore, a host of 
national regulations keep labour market fragmented.   
The picture that emerges is thus of a very uneven state of integration, with financial markets 
at the forefront of it and labour markets at the other end. A good summary is that the typical 
citizen of the EU15 holds 35% of his or her equity portfolio in assets issued by non-national 
OECD issuers but devotes only 14% of his spending to products imported from other OECD 
                                                 
2 And Bruegel chairman.  
3 What is being compared here is not the home bias across states within the US to the home bias across countries 
within the EU, but the home bias of the average EU country compared to that of the US as a whole.    5
countries. She has a meagre 1.6% probability to reside in a country of which she is not a 
national
4. 
Not only is integration more pronounced, but as apparent in the Figure, the trend towards it 
has in recent years been much faster for financial markets than for product (and also labour) 
markets. One or two decades ago, the future euro area was barely a financially integrated area. 
We do not have long series on bilateral financial flows but a rough indication of the 
magnitude of the change is for example that Spain’s gross external assets (as well as 
liabilities) increased more than fivefold between 1984 and 1994, and again between 1994 and 
2004. This dwarfs by far the growth in exports and imports. 
 
2. In a second best world 
Should this situation be regarded as sub-optimal? The optimistic answer is that Europeans 
have for long known that they would be more successful in integrating financial markets than 
product markets, let alone labour markets. European financial integration is also part of a 
global trend towards financial liberalisation which, unlike the liberalisation of goods and 
services, has not been confronted with significant resistance so far. The imbalance is however 
probably more pronounced than anticipated and it has every probability to persist for many 
years. The question is, what does this imply for the policy agenda? Should financial 
integration be considered as a goal in itself, that can be pursued irrespective of what is taking 
place on other markets? As a complement to real integration – which could imply to hold it 
back in order for other sectors to have time to catch up? As a substitute – which would lead to 
the opposite conclusion? Or as an accelerator, which implies that it should it be pushed further 
in the hope that other sectors will follow?  
As already mentioned, the standard approach is based on the first answer. Financial 
integration is regarded as an end in its own right and it is expected to yield benefits 
irrespective of what happens in other fields. In short: too much of a good thing can only be a 
good thing.    
This assumption was for example explicit in the study on the macroeconomic effects of 
financial integration prepared by London Economics (2002) for the European Commission. 
This study essentially quantifies the reduction in the cost of equity, debt and credit that can be 
expected from the integration of capital markets and the corresponding GDP gain over a 
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medium-term horizon. The more the cost of capital decreases, the better, independently from 
any particular assumption about goods and labour market integration and whatever the 
segment of capital markets responsible for the decrease.   
This way of thinking has two interesting consequences. One is that the gains from integration 
are essentially a growing function of its degree. Nothing implies that the agenda must be held 
back if other sectors do not catch up, and nothing that it must be entirely implemented. While 
it is sometimes claimed that no gain can be reaped until 100% of the agenda is implemented, 
this is only true when it amounts to the building of a network. When advances in integration 
can be measured in basis points, whatever fraction of it that leads to a decrease in the cost of 
capital can be implemented, the end-effect will be strictly proportional .   
For example, on the basis of the assumptions made
5, the London economics study envisages a 
1.1% medium term increase in EU15 GDP – not an unusual order of magnitude for this type 
of study. As the equity and corporate bond markets have recently experienced significant 
progress in integration
6, part of this effect is presumably behind us already. What can be 
obtained by further efforts is probably a fraction of the 1.1% GDP increase – barely a strong 
incentive to overcome strong national or local resistance to the liberalisation of banking and 
other financial services
7.  
The other consequence is that integration appears to yield modest gains. It is worth recalling 
that according to the European Commission, GDP per head in the US was in 2005 38% higher 
than in the EU15. Though very rough, the figure suggests there is considerable scope for 
policy-led improvements in our economic performance. Admittedly, this gap does not only 
reflect an efficiency shortfall, but also different social preferences – for example as regards 
working hours or holidays. How much of the 38% corresponds to genuine preferences and 
how much to policy failures is a matter for dispute among economists
8, but what is certain is 
that the numbers at stake are of a different order of magnitude: there must be policies that 
have the potential to raise output per head by several times more than 1.1%
9.   
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The observation that the standard gains from financial integration are dwarfed by those from 
remedying policy failures is not an unusual one. For example Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) 
use a calibrated neoclassical growth model to quantify the welfare gains from financial 
account liberalisation in a capital-poor country. Even in this rather favourable case they find 
that those gains are markedly inferior to those arising from the removal of the domestic 
distortions that prevent productivity from taking off. 
What I am saying here is not that we should downplay financial integration, rather that it 
should not be considered in isolation when assessing its potential contribution to growth and 
welfare in the EU and the euro area. Europe has first order problems – unemployment, low 
labour utilisation, slow productivity growth; and difficulties with the functioning of the euro 
area – and a high cost of capital for the large corporations which have access to equity and 
bond markets is not one of them. Therefore, what really matters, and what European 
policymakers should focus on, is to what extent financial integration and financial sector 
reform can contribute to solving those first order problems.  
The approach advocated here dwells on a recent literature on economic reforms that advocates 
the choice of explicit priorities. In a development context, Ricardo Hausmann, Dani Rodrik 
and Andrés Velasco (2005) criticise what the call the “laundry-list approach to reform that 
implicitly relies on the notions that (i) any reform is good; (ii) the more areas reformed, the 
better; and (iii) the deeper the reform in any area, the better”. They claim that such a strategy 
can be a waste of political capital and that in the presence of significant distortions, it is not 
guaranteed that it will improve welfare. They propose instead to focus on the most binding 
constraints on growth. In a similar vein, the OECD (2005) has undertaken a systematic 
assessment of the main constraints on growth and employment in its member countries and 
has come up with a method to select country-by-country policy priorities
10.  
The EU, however, has precisely tended to follow the laundry list strategy through pushing for 
integration – including financial integration - wherever feasible. The belief behind it was 
precisely that integration was a goal in itself and that it could be aimed at in all sectors, 
leading to a piling up of the corresponding benefits.  
Disappointing results with this strategy have not yet led to the emergence of a better one. The 
strategic approach advocated by Hausmann and his colleagues has not been translated into a 
policy agenda for the EU. The national reform programmes which form part of the Lisbon 
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agenda could be an instrument to this end, but neither their preparation nor their assessment 
by the Commission are based on a systematic approach (Pisani-Ferry and Sapir, 2006).  
 
3. EU priorities and the financial integration agenda 
To develop a systematic blueprint for a more strategic approach to European financial 
integration is beyond the scope of this paper. What I wish to do here is to start from the policy 
priorities of the EU and to outline in a sketchy manner what kind of reasoning and proposals 
such an approach would give rise to.  
Two pressing issues today in the EU are (i) employment and growth and (ii) divergence 
within the euro area. The first one mostly relates to efficiency and the second to stability – 
both cardinal European objectives. The first one has been around for a very long time, while 
the second has only recently come to the forefront of the policymakers’ concerns. They are 
therefore good test cases for the approach suggested here and for discussing what the 
contribution of financial integration can be. 
Efficiency 
Let us start with growth. The by now well-known stylised fact emerging from micro data is 
that the growth rate of newly created firms is markedly lower in the EU than in the US. This 
does not only contribute to reducing the pressure on the incumbents and to slowing down their 
replacement by newcomers, but also to lowering overall productivity growth (Bartelsman, 
Haltiwanger and Scarpetta, 2005). The reason is that in the US, a significant part of the 
productivity gains come from a churning effect – that is, the replacement of less productive 
firms par new entrants – while in Europe, productivity gains tend to take place inside existing 
companies – through capital deepening and incremental innovation. All in all, the EU loses on 
three fronts: competition is less intense, productivity growth is lower, and there is a more 
acute trade-off between productivity and employment creation – a trade-off that the US seems 
to ignore.    
There is not yet a compelling account of the reasons behind the slow development of Europe’s 
young companies. It is however known that besides obstacles on product and labour markets, 
the emergence and growth of such firms depend on the quality and quantity of external 
finance (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Aghion (2006) reports that in sectors which intrinsically 
depend on external finance, financial development plays a stronger role than labour market 
flexibility in fostering post-entry growth.  Evidence confirms that potentially fast-growing   9
new European companies do face limitations in their access to finance and that this constrains 
their ability to grow (Inderst and Müller, 2006)
11.  
The main channel here is not the overall cost of capital, rather the supply of funds to growing 
companies and their adequacy to the need of this particular type of demand. In other words, 
fast-growing small firms do not benefit, directly at least, from an efficient and liquid 
corporate bonds market (which does benefit to the incumbents). Whether bid-ask spreads on 
that market are higher or lower than in the US is of little concern to them. What matters for 
those firms is the supply of credit and venture capital and the liquidity of the market for equity 
at the time of IPOs. It could even be argued that by lowering the cost of capital for corporate 
bond issuers, financial integration may have strengthened the competitive advantage of the 
large incumbents and further discouraged entry.      
ECB research (Hartmann et al., 2006) confirms that whereas the size of European capital 
markets (measured by the sum of stock market capitalisation, private bond outstanding and 
bank credit to the private sector as a proportion of GDP) is about one-half the size of US 
capital markets for the euro area and three-fourths for the UK, the same ratios are respectively 
one-fifth and one-third for venture capital. This suggests that early-stage financing is the 
financial Achilles’ heel of European growth.  
Furthermore, financial sector reform can complement other reforms of products and labour 
markets that aim at favouring a more dynamic market and they can facilitate them. Since Coe 
and Snower (1997) and Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), it has become commonplace to 
observe that product market reforms may foster labour market reforms. There is increasing 
interest among researchers for interactions between, on the one hand, capital markets and, on 
the other hand, labour or product markets (Wasmer and Weil, 2004, Rendon 2005).  
There are several ways in which financial reforms can have a role in triggering changes in 
labour and product market
12. An efficient capital market first puts pressure on reallocating 
capital from the ailing sectors and companies to the growing ones, thereby adding incentives 
to reform. Second, it facilitates this reallocation and therefore reduces the economic and social 
cost of restructuring. Third, it may increase the intertemporal pay-off from labour and product 
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perpetuation of the industrial structure.   
12 There have been several instances in which this has happened, notably in France where the banking reforms 
of the mid-1980s set in motion a process of non-financial exit and entry (Bertrand et al. 2006). 
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market reforms through alleviating liquidity constraints and accelerating their medium-term 
job creation effects.  
Summing up, the overall degree of financial integration as summarised by aggregate price 
convergence indicators may matter less than the efficiency of the financial system, its ability 
to channel funds to young companies and its contribution to economic transformation. 
Policymakers in the EU are certainly aware of these effects and in recent years, emphasis has 
increasingly been put on the financing of innovation through targeted instruments (EIB loans) 
and the promotion of venture capital markets. But the integrationist logic tends to prevail over 
the efficiency logic and complementarities between capital markets, product markets and 
labour market reforms have yet to be addressed in an integrated fashion.  
Stability 
As regards stability, it has been known for long that financial integration helps coping with 
asymmetric shocks. There are two different channels for that: first, the holding of foreign 
assets is a way to diversify risk and to avoid correlation between fluctuations in labour and 
capital income. Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996) have shown on US states that this is a 
significant channel of risk-sharing and it is increasingly at work in Europe as cross-border 
holdings of assets has developed. Second, cross-border lending or borrowing smoothes 
fluctuations in consumption when a country is confronted with shocks to income. Financial 
integration can therefore to some degree substitute other channels of adjustment such as 
labour mobility (and it can actually be superior from a welfare point of view as long as shocks 
remain temporary).  
This suggests that financial integration is even more desirable in a monetary union when 
incomplete real integration results in both asymmetric shocks and weak adjustment 
mechanisms. It is, from this angle, a substitute to real integration and seems to be just what 
EMU needs.  
Turning to data, there is evidence of a relaxation of current account constraints since the 
launch of the euro. From 1990 to 1997, current account balances within the euro-11 
(Luxembourg excluded) were on average comprised between -4.3% and +5% of GDP. From 
1998 to 2005, i.e. after the selection of the participants in the euro, this range has widened to 
[-8.1, 6.9]. What was expected has in fact happened. The vanishing of constraints on the 
current account within a unified financial and monetary area was explicitly identified early on   11
as one of the benefits of the euro, and their actual relaxation should not be regarded as a 
surprise. 
The question however is whether increased cross-border capital flows actually contributed to 
stability or, on the contrary, to destabilising the euro area. Recent difficulties in Portugal and 
Italy and increasing worries about Spain have highlighted the problem of macroeconomic 
divergence (Blanchard 2006; Ahearne and Pisani-Ferry, 2006). Seven years into the euro, 
persistent differences in inflation have translated into real exchanges rate changes that are 
often not consistent with underlying fundamentals – especially in Portugal and Italy. 
Interestingly, Portugal and Spain are among the countries with the highest current account 
deficits: in Portugal, the deficit reached 10% of GDP in 2000; in Spain, it is expected to 
exceed 8% in 2006.    
There are two reasons why financial integration may have contributed to building up 
problems. The first has to do with the origin of the shock that initially led to the widening of 
current account deficits and the second with the uneven integration of products and capital 
markets.  
In all countries which previously suffered from high risk premia, the sudden and large drop in 
the bonds rate that followed the introduction of the single currency represented a significant 
shock to wealth and demand. In Portugal at least, the choice was made to pass on to 
consumers the corresponding reduction in the public debt burden. This contributed to a 
sizeable appreciation of the real exchange rate and a widening of the current account deficit.  
It would obviously be wrong to say that in the case of Portugal and other deficit countries, 
financial integration and liberalisation were intrinsically destabilising. However, financial 
relaxation in the context of a fiscal discipline framework aiming at controlling the budget 
deficit, rather than the primary deficit, favoured an imprudent macroeconomic policy which in 
the end resulted in a lasting deterioration of the external position of the country. What was a 
problem was the combination of financial integration with a multilateral surveillance 
framework which failed to address the risk of contributing to excess demand and the building 
up of real exchange rate misalignments.  
The shock at the time of the introduction of the euro was a once-and-for-all event. The second 
reason why financial integration may play a destabilising role has a more permanent 
character. It comes from real interest rate differentials. According to the so-called Walters 
critique, a monetary union runs the risk of vicious circles in which the rise in inflation in a   12
particular country reduces the real interest rate and thereby contributes to further stimulating 
excess demand – especially in the non-traded goods sector and in real estate. This can be 
counterbalanced by the competitiveness channel, i.e. the effect of a real appreciation on trade 
flows and investment, but the strength and speed of this channel depend on the degree of 
products markets integration. If this integration is low, the competitiveness channel is not 
powerful enough to counterbalance the effect of domestic demand and divergence may build 
up for an extended period of time, giving rise to boom and bust cycles involving foreign 
borrowing. There is evidence that such mechanisms are at work in the case of the euro area.    
The problem here is clearly one of complementarity of policies across markets. The first-order 
response is certainly not to slow down financial integration, but to strengthen the 
competitiveness channels through making product and labour markets more reactive. But in 
the absence of such reforms, there can be a case for fiscal or supervisory measures that help 
avoiding excessive demand growth.        
Such problems can be compounded by differences in the effectiveness of the transmission of 
monetary policy. The proper functioning of an integrated monetary area requires a high 
degree of uniformity in the transmission of monetary policy impulses to private agents and for 
this to happen, borrowing patterns need to converge, especially as regards the components of 
final demand which are the most sensitive to credit. However, although the existence of 
asymmetries in borrowing patterns has for long been documented, including in ECB research 
(Angeloni, Kashyap and Mojon, 2003), the issue has not been given major priority by 
policymakers.  
Summing up, from the stability standpoint financial integration appears to be at the same time 
a potentially powerful ingredient to the functioning of a monetary union whose product and 
labour markets are less-than-perfectly integrated, and a potential source of asymmetries and 
divergence. Hence, there is a case, first, for fostering complementary measures in fields such 
as products and labour markets reforms and, second, for enhancing macroeconomic 
surveillance and financial supervision in order to avoid financial integration to become a 
source of severe instability. 
        13
4. Conclusions 
This paper started from the observation that although not yet complete, Europe’s financial 
integration is significantly more advanced than products markets integration and, obviously, 
labour markets integration. The question raised was, what should be concluded from this fact?  
My main point is that the traditional answer – ignore whatever happens on other fronts and go 
ahead with financial integration – misses some important dimensions of the discussion. 
Certainly, financial integration has by itself a significant contribution to economic efficiency 
and growth. But this way of looking at the issue does not help focusing the discussion on its 
interaction with other dimensions of the European agenda and the ways through which it 
could contribute to fostering growth and promoting macroeconomic stability.  
This lead to advocate emphasising, rather than integration per se, the leverage of financial 
reforms and their direct or indirect contribution to the solution of the first-order problems of 
the EU and the euro area. Such an attitude requires a more strategic approach to financial 
sector reforms and an explicit identification of the way in which they can help to alleviate the 
main constraints on growth or contribute to improving the stability of the euro area. 
This is admittedly not an easy task. The attraction of a pure integration agenda is that it can be 
pursued by the EU as a medium-term goal, independently from the policies conducted by the 
member states in their fields of competence. Such an agenda does not require coordinating 
policies between the EU and the national level or between member states. It does not even 
require developing an integrated approach to EU-led policies and avoids European 
Commissioners to need to talk to each other.  
On the contrary, it must be recognised that the more strategic approach advocated here may 
involve non-negligible coordination costs. At the euro-area level at least, there would 
nevertheless be merit in pursuing it. This would imply, first, to define a core set of reform 
priorities to which financial integration and reforms could contribute; and second, to enhance 
surveillance and supervision to address more directly potential threats to macroeconomic 
stability in an integrated capital market.   
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